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From a legal perspective, ‘negotiating with religion’ may refer to the constitutional 
arrangements that  European States have negotiated with their established or majority 
churches. In consequence of immigration, these historical compromises are being put 
to the test by the presence of religious communities which were not party to the initial 
arrangements, and judges and legislators are struggling to handle religious claims. 
Attempts at renegotiating constitutional compromises punctually, through case-law or 
legislation, have produced diverging results ranging from the exclusion of religious 
views (recent bans on the burqa) to the accommodation of “moderate” forms of 
religious manifestation (reasoning in the Begum House of Lords case). Whilst 
religious minority claims have prompted a review of the concepts of law, democracy 
and pluralism and raised the fundamental question as to the limits that law (as 
opposed to other norms) should impose on individual freedom in the name of social 
cohesion, legal responses have in turn highlighted the blurred distinction and inner 
tensions between the religious and the secular
2
 and created new subcategories 
between “moderate” and “radical” forms of religion. Focusing on recent 
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 See the discussion of the cultural/religious dimension of crucifixes in Italian state schools in the two 
European Court of Human Rights’ Lautsi cases, infra n 11 and n 18. 
developments relating to religious symbols in Western European state schools, this 
chapter will argue that re-negotiation of historical compromises is possible (and 
welcome) within existing national frameworks of state/religion relationships. The 
attention will be on the reasoning adopted at legislative and judicial level. It will be 
submitted that if courts and parliament more greatly engaged with religious claims, 
many of the current tensions and contradictions between secularism and religion 
would dissolve. But how exactly is this new form of negotiating with religion to be 
undertaken by legislators and judges? To explore this delicate question, the chapter 
will concentrate on the education sector. 
State schools are a particularly opportune field for testing new forms of negotiation 
between the law and religious claims. From an historical and constitutional 
perspective, state schools are emblematic of the chosen national model of church/state 
relationships.
3
 Education is also a network of potentially conflicting rights and 
interests
4. Educational systems committed to children’s rights will need to respect 
pupils’ convictions (which may coincide or diverge from their parents’ beliefs) whilst 
maintaining children’s right to “an open future”.5 How is negotiating with religion 
likely to take place in this context? In a school context, negotiation with religion 
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usually addresses the equilibrium to be struck between majority and minority 
religions. Negotiation with religion can thus be construed, first of all, as involving 
special consideration by lawmakers towards religious views. Furthermore, amongst 
those religious views, minority voices would seem to call for particular attention. In 
this approach, negotiated legal solutions would entitle a greater diversity of actors to 
intervene in legal regulation of religion than normal majoritarian parliamentary law-
making.
6
 In fine, negotiating with religion could thus be interpreted as a tool to 
redress the imbalance between majority and minority religious views. As an 
instrument designed to heighten the role of religion in law-making, negotiating with 
religion at school may seem to conflict with the requirements of state neutrality. This 
“special nature” of religion would certainly warrant justification. Conceptually one 
may be attracted to one of two sides of the concept of neutrality.
7
 Under an inclusive 
version of neutrality, all local religious beliefs would need to be represented in the 
local school. Religious education courses would thus have to make room for even 
time of study for each religion and worldview and classroom walls would be adorned 
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by symbols of each faith. Conversely, an exclusive version of neutrality would be 
illustrated by blank classroom walls and religion-free syllabi.  
This chapter will argue against these two opposite and radical solutions. Not only are 
they artificial. The illusion that it is possible to strike a fair balance between all forms 
of belief at school or that a space free of beliefs can be created informs both solutions. 
Besides, neither of these solutions is necessary to fulfil human rights requirements. 
Prominence of one particular religion – be it that of the majority – may still comply 
with state neutrality if its display pursues a legitimate aim and does not stifle the 
manifestation of other beliefs. As this chapter will argue, imbalance in favour of 
majority views need not entail a violation of human rights. Furthermore, there is no 
reason why this conclusion should vary depending on whether the majority views are 
secular or religious. Negotiating with religion will not therefore be understood in this 
chapter as an instrument to foster religious views over secular outlooks nor will it 
necessarily entail systematically injecting more power to minority views. Negotiating 
with religion is not designed to achieve particular outcomes. It is mainly a process 
under which each interested party should be given the opportunity to put their view 
forward and have their interests considered. In fact tying the negotiating process to 
particular outcomes (be they the eradication of religion altogether or the exact same 
standing for all beliefs) would be antagonistic to true negotiating. Negotiating must 
mean that the end result remains open and that positions of compromise can be 
entertained.  
But this emphasis on the open-endedness of negotiating should not be a vehicle for 
stronger parties to impose their views. Careful scrutiny will therefore be needed to 
ensure that the same opportunities are afforded to every participant. The search for a 
compromise between majority and minority views may not always be sufficient to 
ensure respect for individual rights to freedom of /from religion. Unless attention is 
given to the circumstances of individual cases in the implementation of legal 
solutions, there is a danger that negotiation with religion will muffle the voices of 
those most concerned: in our setting, usually the students wishing to manifest their 
beliefs at school. This chapter will in turn address the conceptual and practical hurdles 
to negotiating with religion in state schools. Conceptually, negotiating with religion 
implies that radical solutions are not the only possible means to satisfying fairness and 
neutrality.
8
 Welcoming all expressions of religion at school on an equal standing or 
banning all religious signs altogether may theoretically and constitutionally amount to 
sound decisions. The purpose of the chapter is to demonstrate that a third option –
which gives a greater weight to one or a few religion(s) over others– may also be 
acceptable. Under the prism of negotiation, positions of compromises are not 
problematic per se. All depends on whether the prominence afforded to a particular 
religion relies on legitimate grounds in the given circumstances. In this chapter, I will 
argue that this more subtle apprehension of religion at school is compatible with 
requirements of state neutrality and human rights prescriptions. 
Having overcome the theoretical objections to engaging in open-ended negotiations 
with religious actors, the chapter will go on to address the practical hurdles involved 
in these negotiations at school. The infinite possibilities afforded by negotiating 
techniques may in fact prove to be very limited. Depending on who is allowed to have 
their say and be truly heard, negotiating with religion may or may not be compliant 
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with human rights requirements. If negotiating with religion at a regulatory level is 
often used to push forward a tamed version of religion, commitments to equality and 
human rights should encourage a more demanding version of negotiation. As this 
chapter will argue, negotiation with religion should therefore also be carried out at the 
enforcement stage. Thus construed and applied, it is submitted that negotiation with 
religion can achieve a more fluid approach to regulation which reconciles 
requirements stemming from constitutional national frameworks, individual human 
rights and local factors.  
Conceptual Hurdles to Negotiating with Religion at School  
This part will address objections in principle to negotiating with religion. Interestingly 
concerns about negotiating legal solutions come from opposite ends of legal theory. 
For tenants of a strict parliamentary sovereignty, negotiated legal regulation would 
jeopardize the privileged position of majority views which are the usual outcome of 
democratic decision making. Do claims raised by religious parents or children really 
require the tweaking of democratic solutions, they would ask? Similarly, but for 
opposite reasons, most multiculturalists would no doubt see negotiating with religion 
as an inherently flawed technique.
 9
 If the stronger position of the majority religion is 
structurally ingrained,
10
 how can negotiations not be tainted and the balance then 
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tilted towards the majority religion? For the former group, the solution lies in 
legislative uniform intervention which embodies common values par excellence. 
Negotiation techniques would simply have no place in law-making except for the 
realm of contracts. Less radically, this conception of law may accommodate varied 
solutions at local level, provided powers to regulate have been devolved to local 
authorities. Social cohesion and the unifying power of law are thus emphasised. From 
a strong multiculturalist perspective on the other hand, negotiating with religion is not 
satisfactory because it does not ensure systematic redress of minority positions. On 
the contrary the privileged social position enjoyed by majority views gives them a 
head start in the negotiation process. Negotiation with religion may therefore just be a 
subtle and deceiving way to reinforce the status quo. Instead – they claim- all 
instances whereby the majority religion is given greater weight or visibility should be 
challenged. This part will respond to this last claim.
11
  
Is the greater prominence given in state schools to the majority religion problematic 
per se? Does it necessarily contradict state neutrality or/and violate individual human 
rights to freedom of religion? These crucial questions were addressed by the 
European Court of Human Rights in the Lautsi case.
12
 In this case, the Grand 
Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights confirmed that the prominence 
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given to the country’s majority religion need not violate convention rights.13 The 
obligatory display of crucifixes in Italian state school classrooms was therefore 
upheld despite the impressionable age of the audience (young pupils), the enclosed 
nature of school settings and compulsory school attendance.
14
 The fact that the 
crucifix was mandated by state authorities and that Catholicism was thus endorsed by 
the State was also set aside. All of these factors may be problematic for a 
constitutional court. Certainly the endorsement of a particular religion by the State as 
well as the impossibility for pupils to escape the image of the crucifix has been held 
to be unconstitutional for the German constitutional court.
15
 But the European Court 
of Human Rights is not  a constitutional court.
16
 It is up to Member States to choose 
their own conception of neutrality as long as it is enforced in a manner respectful of 
religious freedom under article 9 of the Convention. States will thus be free to decide 
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under their own constitutional and legal frameworks whether negotiating with religion 
at school should be resisted or welcome and if it is, whether it may extend to state 
endorsed measures, affect civil servants or only concern pupils. There are as many 
right answers to these questions as they are possible versions of neutrality and forms 
of church/state arrangements. In that sense, the reference to the concept of margin of 
appreciation by the Court in the Lautsi decision is understandable.
17
 The alternative 
would be to consider that the mandatory display of a symbol of the majority religion 
in state schools inevitably stands in contradiction with the concept of state neutrality, 
however construed. It may indeed be argued that by endorsing a particular religious 
symbol and a fortiori by making its display mandatory, state authorities are siding 
with the majority religion.
18
 This can be criticized at two levels: on a theoretical level, 
it may be seen as incompatible with neutrality; at an individual level, this attitude may 
be accused of generating an expressive harm to students and staff holding different 
religious beliefs or none.
 19
 As a result of the official display of the crucifix, staff and 
students holding different beliefs may feel that they cannot participate as 
meaningfully as their peers who belong to the majority Catholic religion. This can 
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however be contested: rather, the prominence given to the majority religion may be 
acceptable at both theoretical and individual levels. The counter-position was taken 
by the Chamber decision. Let us therefore examine its reasoning. 
In the Chamber decision first rendered in the Lautsi case,
20
 the crucifix was described 
as carrying, among the plurality of its potential meanings, a predominantly religious – 
Catholic – meaning. This was then held to be inescapably incompatible with the 
convictions of non-believers as well as with the beliefs of pupils of other religions. On 
3 November 2009, the Chamber of the Second Section of the Court therefore went on 
to declare that there had been a violation of the European Convention on Human 
Rights. Such reasoning – with a narrow focus on the symbol of the crucifix itself is –I 
would argue– misplaced. Taken to its logical limits, it would imply the removal of all 
religious symbols from the public sphere because religious symbols will necessarily 
have an exclusionary effect. This is because the deeper religious meaning of the 
symbol will be lost on those who do not belong to the faith associated with that 
symbol. After all, the essence of religious symbols is to denote a particular affiliation 
and in so doing to differentiate those who belong to a particular faith and those who 
do not. But must it follow that as such religious symbols run counter to the 
requirements of pluralism and state neutrality –at least when symbols are exhibited in 
institutional settings? It need not. Respect for pluralism and state neutrality does not 
entail the absence of religion in the institutional sphere.
21
 As Ooijen says,  
In the end, neutrality is something which can hardly be seen separate from 
individuals who perceive it. Letting this perception centre on the significance 
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and effect of a symbol in fact testifies to the limits of a legal approach in 
raising theological and empirical questions
22
  
Malcolm Evans has argued, very convincingly, that the European Convention on 
Human Rights does not require that an appearance of strict neutrality be enforced, but 
more meaningfully demands that the educational experience is — in its substance — 
compliant with the plurality of convictions. Religion may therefore appear in 
institutional settings as long as its display does not have an effect of indoctrination. 
Put differently, this effect of indoctrination cannot be equated to the mere presence of 
the crucifix. If it did, it would be tantamount to imposing a separatist model as the 
only possible ‘church–state’ model across Europe. The European Court of Human 
Rights on the contrary has recognized the legitimacy of a diversity of ‘church–state’ 
relationships across Europe.
23
 The presence of a religious symbol in an institutional 
setting as such does not necessarily deviate from the requirements of state neutrality 
and pluralism. When it does, this deviation does not in itself entail a violation of 
human rights. Secondly, must it follow from observing the differing impact of 
religious symbols on members and non-members of the relevant faith that symbols 
will inevitably give rise to a clash of individual rights? It need not either. The decision 
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to display religious symbols – if made by an individual or a group – may amount to a 
manifestation of religious faith protected under article 9 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights, but the desire to have these religious symbols removed cannot find 
justification in any counter individual right. There is no right to be spared from the 
sight of symbols.
24
 The tension therefore remains. A pragmatic approach, however, of 
negotiating with religious actors, may provide a more satisfying solution. 
 
Negotiating the Display of Majority Religious Symbols  
The meaning of negotiating with religion at school needs to be clarified. It does not 
suggest that the issue as to whether crucifixes should remain on or be removed from 
state school classroom walls be subject to local deliberation, through a vote by 
parents, pupils and staff members. This is not what I advocate for under the concept 
of ‘negotiating with religion’. This prolongation of democratic decision-making at the 
school level would not ensure satisfactory representation of minority voices. 
Conversely, one objection to the display of religious symbols should not necessarily 
override other parents and pupils’ wishes either:25 The wishes of the majority cannot 
be discredited simply because they are those of the majority.
26
 The negotiating 
process I advocate is best characterized as a balancing exercise. In the context of the 
Lautsi case, it would have led to weighing up the impact of the crucifix against the 
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overall attitude towards religion in the Italian school in question. In light of the 
openness of the Italian school to other religions, as illustrated by the possibility for 
pupils of all faiths to wear religious symbols or the accommodation for attendance to 
religious festivals of all creeds,
27
 one might have concluded that the emphasis given 
to Catholicism and Christianity through the display of crucifixes in the classroom was 
balanced by the overall benevolent attitude towards all religions at school.  
A ‘negotiating with religion’ approach would also be more in line with the rights at 
stake. The presence of the crucifix allegedly violated the atheist claimants’ (and other 
pupils’) rights to freedom from religion, which is protected under article 9 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. It also potentially contravened their mother’s 
right to have her children educated in accordance with her (atheist) convictions, which 
is protected under article 2 of the First Protocol to the European Convention on 
Human Rights. I would argue that article 2 of the First Protocol postulates 
‘negotiating with religion’. Article 2 of the First Protocol does not entitle parents to 
protection from all traces of religion or equivalent philosophies different from their 
own;
28
 neither does it allow parents to request that all aspects of the school 
environment comply with their own beliefs. This provision, however, enables parents 
to complain should schools aim at or introduce measures that have an effect of 
indoctrination of students.
29
 In other words, article 2 of the First Protocol forbids 
radical postures that are intolerant of other beliefs, whether they come at the request 
of parents or are decided by school authorities. In order to assess whether a parent’s 
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claim is legitimate, it is therefore essential to verify that both parties (parents and 
school authorities) are not acting out of pure intolerance. On the part of the school, 
this entails that the presence of crucifix does not serve an aim of indoctrination; on the 
part of the claimant parent, this implies that the infringement suffered hinges on more 
than a distaste for the display of differing beliefs. Neither of these verifications can 
convincingly be carried out without considering the overall environment surrounding 
the display of the crucifix and more broadly, without examining the school context as 
a whole. It therefore logically follows that a balancing exercise is inherent in the 
application of article 2 of Protocol I.  
It is in the evaluation of the possible powers of indoctrination associated with the 
crucifix present in state classrooms that the Chamber and Grand Chamber most 
diverged. The Chamber judgment referred to factors which contributed to reinforcing 
the message of the crucifix to the point of making it ‘compelling’.30 By contrast the 
Grand Chamber downplayed the influence that the crucifix may have had on pupils.
31
 
If, as decided in the Chamber judgment, the message of the crucifix combined with 
the vulnerability of its observers amounts to indoctrination, nothing more needs to be 
said: a violation of article 2 of Protocol 1 must follow. Another educational purpose, 
however, can also be arguably associated with the crucifix: the presence of the 
crucifix in European state schools could help familiarize children with the cultural 
heritage of the nation. The European Court has recognized in the past that emphasis 
given to the dominant religion for historical reasons is compatible with article 2 
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Protocol 1.
32
 However the emphasis must be carried out in a pluralistic, objective and 
critical manner.
33
 In the absence of an opportunity to opt-out, the verification of these 
qualities should have led to an examination of the overall school environment, as 
advocated in the ‘negotiating with religion’ approach. The Grand Chamber overruled 
the Chamber decision but did not follow the approach herein recommended. In order 
to downplay the impact of the crucifix, the Grand Chamber characterized it as a 
passive symbol
34
 and underlined the wide margin of appreciation granted to Member 
States in those areas.
35
 Neither of these justifications is convincing. Not only – for 
reasons that fall outside the scope of this chapter – is the notion of passive symbol 
rather puzzling, it also fails to take into account the overall environment and does not 
balance the impact of the crucifix against surrounding factors. As for the repeated 
recourse to the concept of margin of appreciation,
36
 one might think that it is a sign of 
reverence for the national context in which the case emerged. The concept of margin 
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of appreciation
37
 affords States some leeway on particular sensitive issues on which 
there is no consensus across countries of the Council of Europe. It therefore often 
enables States to assert their own national distinctiveness on particular delicate 
issues.
38
 If, however, the way that religion is represented in state schools as a whole 
falls under the margin of appreciation afforded to Member States, the protection 
granted under article 9 of the Convention and article 2 of the First protocol may 
seriously be undermined. The insistence on the margin of appreciation in Lautsi is 
therefore unsatisfactory.
39
 Rather than underlining a pertinent reverence to context, it 
seems instead to signal a reluctance by the Court to carry out a thorough assessment 
of the circumstances of the case. ‘Negotiating with religion’ would, on the other hand, 
necessarily ensure that a vigorous balancing exercise could not be avoided. Does this 
conclusion preclude any legislative uniform regulation of religion at schools? The 
concept of negotiation with religion does not demand that all regulations rely on local 
consultation. It will, however, always require a balancing exercise at the enforcement 
stage. This requirement should alleviate concerns about the practical implementation 
of negotiations with religion, notably the fear that the voices of those most concerned 
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would be muffled by compromises reached at higher level between more powerful 
actors. 
 
Practical Hurdles to Negotiating with Religion at School 
Having overcome objections raised in principle against negotiating with religion in 
state schools and demonstrated that this process, understood as an open-ended 
balancing exercise between competing interests, can be compatible both with the 
requirements of state neutrality and human rights, this final part will address more 
practical concerns. The concept of negotiation – at first associated with contract law – 
has spread well beyond this field, carried by assumptions about its inherent fairness.
40
 
This assumption of fairness has long been disputed in contract law and in echo to 
Fouillée’s famous quote,41 Lacordaire points out that freedom of contracts will benefit 
the stronger party.
42
 Negotiating with religion at school may generate similar fears. Is 
there not a risk that the negotiating process will benefit the stronger party? The 
purpose of this final part is therefore to consider the various safeguards that need to be 
put in place in order to prevent such concerns from materialising. Let us therefore 
consider the various levels at which negotiating with religion may take place and 
examine in each instance how to ensure that the weaker parties also have their say in 
the process.  
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At a preliminary stage, one may discern that judges will engage with concepts of 
religion for the sake of defining what beliefs and practices qualify as ‘religious’ under 
article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights. At this preliminary stage, 
negotiation will take place in the loose sense of stretching the boundaries of concepts 
in order to welcome (or reject) a given practice within protected categories. In the 
past, the European Commission on Human Rights seemed to have put claims based 
on religious freedom to a test of necessity: the applicant, it was suggested in some 
cases,
43
 had to show that a particular practice was necessary to his/her religion in 
order for it to be protected. According to this test, the wearing of religious dress will 
often be controversial as in most cases it will be seen at most as being encouraged by 
a religious institution but will rarely be imposed as being mandatory. The test would 
thus restrict the protection to practices which are non-negotiable for the believers 
because they are truly compulsory in the eye of their religious community. English 
Courts have at times seemed to apply a similar reasoning. In Playfoot,
44
 the High 
Court held that the practice of wearing a purity ring was not intimately linked to the 
claimant’s Christian beliefs because the claimant was under no religious obligation to 
wear it. Such an approach is dismissive of many if not most religious practices. It is 
now accepted that any manifestation or conduct which gives expression to religion or 
belief will fall under the ambit of article 9(1) of the European Convention on Human 
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Rights which protects freedom of religion and belief.
45
 In recent cases, the subjective 
conviction by the applicant that the symbol or attire in question expresses a religious 
duty has been sufficient to trigger the application of article 9(1) of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, consequently shifting onto the State the onus to 
demonstrate that the interference caused to that practice could be justified under the 
subsequent paragraph. Whether in its first restrictive approach or in the more open 
model, the European Court does not, it seems, ‘negotiate’ the concept of religion as 
such. On the contrary, the early test of necessity was a technique designed to avoid 
any confrontation with religion by restricting the protection to unproblematic cases 
which obviously had a religious dimension. Similarly, the present approach makes 
negotiation with religion at this conceptual level unnecessary. By adopting what is 
essentially a subjective test of what constitutes religion, the European Court (and 
indeed English courts if we are to follow the precedent of Williamson)
46
 avoids the 
issue of definition. Such a delicate enterprise of definition seems indeed unnecessary 
given that the protection afforded by article 9(1) extends to non-religious beliefs and 
manifestations anyway. One may also wonder whether judges would be the best 
placed to discuss matters of religious doctrine. From the angle of negotiation, such 
attempts may be criticized as conferring too much power on the State (through its 
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judges) to frame the discussion and its outcome. They do not provide for negotiation 
in the sense of dialogue or exchange of arguments between different sides since 
definitions and meanings are exclusively derived from a state perspective. Delegating 
the matter to expert testimony on the correct interpretation of a particular religious 
requirement may absolve judges from the accusation of mingling with religious 
affairs; however, even presuming that the identification of the relevant expert does not 
prove controversial, passing the problem onto religious scholars will not enable a 
better representation of the minority position. The success of the individual claim will 
still be dependent on the individual practice conforming to orthodox teaching and 
rites. The practical hurdles to negotiating with religion at this preliminary stage 
therefore prove to be too problematic to be overcome. More promising is negotiation 
with religion at ground level, between local actors. 
Negotiation at ground level is carried out between school authorities, governors and 
representatives of religious communities. This process is often seen as the ideal tool 
to reach legal solutions which will be acceptable to all at local level. Section 149(1) of 
the Equality Act 2010 which came into force in April 2011 provides that in the 
exercise of its functions public authorities such as schools must have due regard to the 
need to inter alia: 
foster good relations between persons who share a religion or belief and persons 
who do not share it. 
In England and Wales, school uniform policies in state schools will thus usually be 
the outcome of consultation with representatives of major religious communities. In 
the case of Begum,
47
 it was thus noted with satisfaction by the Law Lords that the 
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school had gone to great length to devise a uniform policy which all representatives 
of the local religious communities thought appropriate.
48
 The governing body of the 
school contained a balanced representation of different sections of school 
community; four out of six parent governors were Muslim and the consultation 
process had been extensive.
49
 At this level, negotiation takes place in a fuller sense as 
it involves the exchange of arguments and does lead to a solution which is not 
predetermined but open to the compromises which may emerge as a result of the 
dialogue. However, the openness of the process is not complete. Undoubtedly 
moderate solutions of compromise will be favoured. Indeed it is the option on which 
the majority of the religious groups consulted – generally of mainstream moderate 
schools – are most likely to concur. Moreover the main addressees of the negotiation 
outcomes – the pupils in this context – will have no direct influence in the exchange 
of views. If religious freedom is an individual human right, how can one justify 
devising solutions which fail to take into account individual views? 
The answer, I would submit, lies in the distinction between two normative levels: if 
the individual or minority views may not legitimately bear a lot of weight in devising 
the rules and policies relating to religion at school, their voice should be heard at the 
enforcement stage. How did the House of Lords (now Supreme Court) tackle these 
two levels in the authoritative case of Begum? The House of Lords ruled that 
individual beliefs should be protected even if, on the facts of the case, it rejected the 
individual claim. One conclusion to draw is therefore that negotiating with 
representatives of majority religions may not be extensive enough for schools to 
comply with legal requirements. In practice it is, however, unlikely that individual 
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claims will be successful if they are raised against well-balanced solutions which are 
well accepted by the local community and the majority of students. If schools are 
under a duty to negotiate in order to promote good relations, so are individuals under 
an implicit duty to respect the overall harmony and refrain from adopting positions 
which would potentially jeopardize the overall equilibrium. This equilibrium may 
conflict with the recognition of individual autonomy and the idea that public 
recognition of the core features of a person’s identity is important to their sense of 
self-worth.
50
 I suggest that a stronger proportionality test should be carried out at the 
enforcement stage. The pitfall of unduly representing stronger parties will be avoided 
if a meaningful balancing exercise is carried out at the enforcement stage. The impact 
of a particular restriction on an individual’s right to freedom of religion should thus 
be assessed against the aim that the measure is pursuing. The Begum case may be 
criticised not because of its unreasonable conclusion but because the point of view of 
the student concerned was largely ignored.
51
 Miss Shabina Begum’s desire to wear a 
less revealing uniform than the attires allowed under her school’s policy was assumed 
to be fickle and coerced. The fact that she had worn the permissible uniform for two 
years without complaint was held to suggest that her change of mind was somewhat 
capricious.
52
 The influence of her brother who had joined a fundamentalist Islamist 
group also shed doubts on the genuineness of Miss Begum’s wish.53 Finally, it was 
feared that allowing her to wear the jilhab might pressurize her peers to also adopt a 
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stricter form of dress.
54
 It could also have been argued, however, that Miss Begum’s 
change of mind about the proper form of dress to wear coincided with her reaching 
puberty. The influence that her brother possibly exercised upon her was a valid 
concern, as was the influence that she herself may have exercised on other female 
pupils; but we cannot simply assume that the request to change her uniform reveals 
influence upon her by her brother or that granting her request would inevitably 
exercise pressure on her school friends. A more vigorous proportionality test, as 
advocated under the concept of negotiating with religion, would require tangible 
elements attesting to the reality of those undue influences. 
Naturally, if the proportionality test becomes too vigorous, it will be tantamount to 
granting individuals positive rights of derogations from general applicable laws and 
policies.
55
 Eventually any sense of common values will be lost. But negotiation at the 
enforcement stage need not be taken this far. What I propose here is not to dilute the 
overarching values that bind school communities. Negotiating with religion at the 
enforcement stage would simply ensure that restrictions to individual religious 
freedoms do not rely on broad assumptions about the meaning and dangers of a 
particular religious symbol. In that sense, negotiating with religion would not dismiss 
legal systems which regulate religious symbols in state schools through legislation. In 
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France, the 2004 law
56
 is the pertinent legal basis on the matter. Under that law, 
pupils attending state primary and secondary schools are banned from wearing 
conspicuous religious symbols. The 2004 law pursues several aims: promoting the 
core and common French value of laïcité
57
 (which has always had a special salience 
in state schools);
58
 protecting heads of schools from the media attention and the 
difficulties they would face if they were left the responsibility of devising negotiated 
solutions at local level; and affording a free neutral space where young girls could 
escape the pressure
59
 they experienced in their communities to wear the veil. The 
purpose of this chapter is not to evaluate the legitimacy of those aims. Reflection on 
these aims and on the proper contours of laïcité would be very valuable;
60
 but such 
enterprise falls outside the scope of the precepts of negotiating with religion. Indeed, 
in the approach I defend, negotiating with religion at school should not be interpreted 
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as a tool to systematically challenge general values but as a technique designed to 
ensure that these are fairly enforced in individual cases.
61
  
Negotiation with religion at school does not take place in a vacuum. It is carried out 
against a broader background of national frameworks and international human rights. 
In that sense, the local negotiation that may (as in Britain) or may no longer (as in 
France, since the 2004 law) take place at local level is itself constrained by these 
broader requirements. These constraints themselves need not be challenged. There is 
value in negotiating legal solutions on the ground: negotiation between local actors 
encourages trust between people as they co-operate, plan common projects, try to 
avoid frictionand recognize their interdependence. But there is also value in devising 
legal solutions in Parliament: the legislative route creates a sense of being part of a 
larger whole – a cohesive, unified, integrated society.62 Negotiating with religion 
does not postulate that the former is superior to the latter. Whatever the chosen form 
of law-making, however, negotiating with religion prescribes that negotiation operates 
at the enforcement stage. It will then take the shape of a balancing exercise between 
competing claims. Proportionality in concrete cases will be key to determining the 
acceptable compromise to be reached in each case. The European Court of Human 
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Rights could be more attentive to the proportionality test. In the Bayrak case,
63
 where 
a young Muslim girl had been expelled from a French state secondary school after 
refusing to remove her veil, the European Court showed extreme reverence towards 
Member States’ positions. In effect, the only element that seemed to have been 
decisive in this case was the legitimate goal pursued by the contested legislative 
measure. Once the Court was satisfied that the relevant legal basis was pursuing a 
legitimate goal (here, prospectively, the 2004 French law defending the constitutional 
value of laïcité), it paid no attention as to how the law had been applied in the 
individual case. It thus entirely dispelled Miss Bayrak’s willingness to wear a black 
cap in lieu of her veil. In comparison to the young girl’s flexibility and 
accommodating attitude, the decision by French school authorities to nevertheless 
expel the student seemed extreme; but it passed the proportionality test before the 
European Court with no problems. The fact that the pupil could enrol for distant 
learning seemed sufficient to justify the expulsion. By contrast, I would argue that the 
possibility – also underlined in the English case of Begum –64 for the pupil to change 
school or enrol for distant learning cannot make the restriction proportionate. If it did, 
the onus of reconciling freedom of religion and education would then rest exclusively 
on the individual. Fortunately this contracting-out approach seems to have been 
abandoned in more recent ECtHR cases.
65
 However it is unlikely to benefit individual 
claimants who wish to wear religious symbols against national values or school 
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policies. In its recent SAS decision,
66
 the European Court of Human Rights held the 
French burqa ban
67
 to be a proportionate interference with religious freedom rights 
even though the prohibition extended to the whole of the public sphere. Two 
considerations were decisive in the Court’s reasoning: the extremely concealing 
nature of the garments prohibited (full-face covering clothing)
68
 and the strong 
national consensus underlying the ban.
69
 As a result, the Court was content to grant 
France a wide margin of appreciation and upheld the ban. To what extent is the 
reasoning adopted in SAS transferrable to religious symbol cases in an educational 
context? The 2004 French ban on religious symbols at school does not only target 
full-face covering garments but applies to all ostentatious religious symbols. However 
underlying common national values feature more strongly in an educational context 
than in the general public sphere. State schools have always been at the epicentre of 
laïcité and at the core of the French national identity. It is therefore unlikely that the 
European Court of Human Rights will, for the near future at least, strengthen its 
proportionality requirements in cases relating to religious symbols at school.  
 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated that negotiating religion at school is of value for law-
makers. Conceived as a balancing exercise between competing interests, it ensures 
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better representation of minority views in legal regulation. In fact, any legal system 
committed to human rights cannot do away with negotiating with religion – at least at 
the enforcement stage. A proportionality test that balances the goal pursued by the 
restrictive school measure against the impact it causes to a particular pupil is 
necessary if individual religious freedom rights are to have any meaning; but the test 
need not slide into systematic rights of accommodation for individuals. If it did, 
negotiating with religion would become the seed for an inclusive version of neutrality 
under which all religions (gradually) achieve equal standing. This chapter has argued 
for a more complex and more context-sensitive approach to negotiating with religion. 
In our approach, neither versions of neutrality is favoured a priori. Outcomes depend 
entirely on the issues at stake and the relevant circumstances. This seemingly complex 
balancing exercise is actually already practiced to varying degrees and with more or 
less success.  
Several layers and forms of negotiation have thus been identified in this chapter. A 
first stage of negotiation – at conceptual level, in the courtroom – implies pushing the 
boundaries of concepts in order to welcome more individual practices within the 
protected categories. A second stage of negotiation – on the ground, in the classroom 
– relies on consultation with local religious communities, the result of which are then 
to be reflected in the local school’s policy. Finally, a third stage of negotiation 
consists of balancing competing claims to individual and group religious identities 
with claims to national identities and social cohesion. The first stage has been largely 
rejected and for good reasons: despite the well-intentioned aim of stretching 
categories in order to allow for greater diversity of manifestations of individual 
beliefs, this negotiation with concepts by judges is to be resisted. Indeed, it would 
lead judges into discussions of religious scholastics for which they are ill-equipped. 
Besides, as judges would retain the control of definitions, this process of negotiation 
would remain largely unilateral and therefore would fail to meet the requirements of a 
fair negotiation process. 
By contrast, negotiation on the ground is a two-way process which involves both 
school authorities and religious actors (via the main religious communities in the 
vicinity). However, the point of view of the most interested parties – individual pupils 
– still remains absent and the dynamic of the whole process is therefore skewed in 
favour of majority mainstream views. If negotiation with religion is to be welcome in 
education, it cannot therefore be in the restricted sense of consultation and 
deliberation at local level but has to imply a broader balancing of conflicting values 
which leaves room both for individual expression and common national values. 
Despite the practical difficulties, negotiating with religion is not therefore a far-
fetched ideal. A few recent developments however push lawyers into the opposite 
direction: the relaxed application of the proportionality test by the European Court of 
Human Rights as illustrated in the Bayrak case or the attraction for the contracting out 
approach for example go against the advocated approach because they do not allow 
for a weighing of competing claims but shift all the onus of adapting (for the latter) or 
all the burden of proof (for the former) onto the individual.  
Conceptually, the proposed approach of ‘negotiating with religion’ may be accused of 
clouding the concept of state neutrality. It is true that the opposition between inclusive 
and exclusive neutrality gives a clearer picture. Under an inclusive version, all 
religions are treated on an equal footing by the State. By contrast, under an exclusive 
version of the concept, public institutions must keep safely away from religion 
altogether. My proposed approach does not give such predetermined answers as to the 
general relationships between the Sate and religion. But far from being a flaw, this 
chapter has argued that this ‘pragmatic plural approach provides more fruitful 
solutions than a narrow-minded, either-or choice for any one of these neutrality 
interpretations’.70  
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